and what it is contrasted with. Human uniqueness has come into sharp focus in recent years because of discussions of 'exobiology': life beyond Earth. Intelligence has frequently been put forward as definitive of human uniqueness, but the 'convergent evolution' of intelligence suggests that intelligence would also evolve elsewhere, leaving human beings unique neither as to distinctiveness nor to excellence. However, while evolution might be convergent over basic characteristics such as intelligence, to how the body is structured seems to be more contingent, and we must take the role of the body's role in thought ('embodied cognition') seriously. Basic bodily differences between putative life-forms might, therefore, lead to strong distinctions between the forms that intelligence takes. Human beings might not be 'unique as superior', but they would be unique as distinct, bodily speaking, and that distinction might be strongly determinative of the way in which intelligence is worked out.
6 The platypus and spiny anteaters. 7 Not only does unique-as-distinctive entail continuity as well as discontinuity, it is also noncompetitive: the distinctiveness of one sort of creature does not preclude, compromise or diminish the distinctiveness of any another. Indeed, the distinctiveness of one entity acts cooperatively with the distinctiveness of another. In being distinctively what it is, it both preserves its own distinctiveness and fails to trespass upon the distinctiveness what it is not. 8 E.g. Topics IV, VI and VII. For a discussion of the variety of presentations of this idea in Aristotle, see Herbert Gerber, 'Aristotle on Genus and Differentia' in Lloyd Gerson (ed.), Aristotle: Critical Assessments (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999), vol. 1, 256-77. 9 Aristotle, On the Soul III.11; Nicomachean Ethics I.13. (Matthew Boyle notes, however, that 'although Aristotle does think that human beings are essentially rational animals, he does not think "rational animal" exhausts our essence' -'Essentially Rational Animals' in Günter Abel and James Conant, eds, Rethinking Epistemology, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012, vol. 2, 395-427, To describe human beings in this way both affirms that they are a kind of animal and that, uniquely among animals, they are rational: there is a unique element (rationality -the 'specific difference'), but being an animal (the generic likeness) is also part of what it means to be human. Both senses of uniqueness are in play here since a specific difference has to be distinctive, and rationality is the most highly prized of distinctive creaturely attributes. Nonetheless, the second sense of uniqueness does not undo the element of continuity implied by the first.
Image and Vestige
Quite apart from the scientific basis for wanting an account of human uniqueness that acknowledges our kinship with the rest of creation, there are theological reasons for wanting to do so, whether from Biblical studies (starting with the observation that the human being is, like other creatures, an earthling -Genesis 2.7, 19) or from doctrine (since which theologian would want to deny that the fundamental characteristics of creatures in general, such as finitude, dependence, and relationality, are also fundamental to human beings?) 10 The mediaevals, again, left a useful tradition for thinking about how the ascription of some property in its highest mode to one creature need not cut that creature off from others, nor entirely exclude those other creatures from that property. They did so with respect to the particularly crucial category when it comes to thinking about human uniqueness, that of bearing the image of God.
Taking Aquinas as our primary example, we might note three points in particular. First, that his sense of human uniqueness sits at ease with some degree of continuity with that with which it is being contrasted, rather than denying it. For Aquinas, the divine likeness is uniquely in human beings (among material creatures) in a unique-as-better sense, but this does not exclude others from bearing some sense of that likeness. If human beings bear the fullest likeness to God -of them alone will he call this likeness 'the image of God' -then some lesser form of likeness is also present in all other creatures. For this, he reserves the name vestigium: a vestige, trace or footprint of God's likeness While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of 'image'… whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a 'trace'.
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The second point identifies another feature of the 'unique among' construction. As well as allowing for a sense of continuity with what (in this case) lies 'beneath it' (other material creatures), such 'among' language also allows for a particular form of disjunction: not in terms of a distinction from that which it is among, but rather in terms of what this 'among' does not take in. Aquinas would say that human beings are uniquely in the image of God among material creatures, but not if we removed the words in italic, since the angels also bear the image, and in general they bear it more perfectly that human beings.
12 If 'unique among' language serves to link human beings with other animals, it also separates distinguishes them, in this regard, from angels.
Thirdly, here Aquinas partially subverts the implication that there is a one-dimensional hierarchy to the likeness. While human beings bear the image generally less perfectly than the angels, there are, nonetheless, specific ways in which the image is more perfectly in human beings than in the angels. 13 He goes no further but we might wonder whether this admission ought to be expanded. Once we start to single out various respects in which the likeness of God is more perfectly in one creature than another, we could perhaps speak of the way in which the stone stands apart in the excellence of its solidity, or the eagle in the keenness of its sight.
Exobiology
At this juncture we can turn to a particular practical example, namely to the topic of The ill-determined factor in any attempt to estimate the extent of life in the universe is the likelihood that life might emerge on any given habitable planet. All the same, from a scientific perspective we can now say not only that the emergence of life is not impossible (we ourselves serve as evidence of that) but also that the seedbeds are profoundly numerous: those perhaps one and half thousand billion billion habitable planets.
If we return to the question as to whether human life is unique, particularly in the sense of 'standing alone… by reason of superior excellence', broadly three scenarios can be put 14 A pivotal moment in thinking about the place of the Earth was Etienne Tempier's condemnation in 1277 of 219 proposition, one being the idea that 'the First Cause cannot make more than one world' (numbered either 27 or 34). The question of life elsewhere was not primarily in view here, but the condemnation certainly shifted the balance of thought about the uniqueness of the Earth. 15 first two are strictly scientific: that life has only emerged once, anywhere, namely on Earth, and that life, however abundant it may be across the heavens, has only achieved intelligence once, again on Earth. A third, strictly theological, possibility would be to insist upon a distinction between forms of intelligence that emerge naturally by evolutionary processes and a 'spiritual awareness' that is bestowed by God outside the natural process and, on this view, has been conferred only upon human beings.
Of these three options, the second seems increasingly unlikely on account of the phenomenon of convergent evolution. This relates to a matter of significant disagreement in recent evolutionary biology. The Stephen Jay Gould was a prominent advocate of a divergent account of evolution, according to which, in his words, if one was to 'replay the tape' of evolutionary history in the same setting, we would find that life took a radically different trajectory. 18 Gould's vision favours contingency while, in contrast, Simon
Conway Morris has argued for a convergent understanding of evolution, where such contingency is rendered more marginal. 19 'Replay' that 'tape' again and again, and evolution would repeatedly produce features that are recognizable, and even closely parallel to life as we know it today. The evidence for this is that evolutionary processes have arrived at various features several times, independently: intelligence and the camera eye (one with a lens) are the most commonly cited examples.
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To a first approximation, we might give Gould the details and Conway Morris the large scale. That a being evolves with ten fingers, or with eyes coloured in one of a certain number of ways, is a matter of contingency. Run the tape of evolution again, here or on another planet, and none of that is set to occur again. But that beings evolve that can spoken about together, as 'sensorimotor capacities', since they 'are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition.' 34 By the end of the 1990s, the idea of embodied cognition had been extended to include 'extended cognition': the recognition that human beings have thought and reasoned with and through the means of pen and paper, slide rules and computers, epistolary exchanges and board meetings. 35 The social forms in which we live have themselves shaped our cognitive skills, and vice versa. Not only, then, does the distinct character of our bodiliness bear upon our perceptions and thoughts (as embodied cognition suggests), but so does the physical character of the world around us, and the ways in which we can interact with it. The story of learning to think plays out in terms of interactions with the world, whether that is the story of an individual or of the species. 36 Returning to uniqueness, Conway Morris's magisterial survey has made a cast iron argument for evolutionary convergence, furnished with a wealth of examples that take in faculties (such as sight, hearing, intelligence and grasp), behaviour (including agriculture and forms of societies) and molecular solutions for performing certain tasks. Keeping intelligence in focus, however, the considerations of embodied and extended cognition remind us of the significance that the degree of divergence in bodily form we would likely find among putative intelligent creatures across the universe would mean for cognition and perception. Very different bodily forms would suggest very different forms of embodied cognition. 37 Uniqueness, at least as distinctiveness, might be profound after all.
